Altogether, the Russians and North Koreans have around 60,000 troops in and around Kursk.
And that advantage could erode quickly if Russian and North Korean commanders don’t adapt to Ukrainian methods.
The darkly camouflaged North Koreans stood out against the white snow, making them easy targets for Ukrainian FPV drones and cluster shells.
The North Koreans have been observed diving out of the way of attacking drones—not always successfully.
Dodging may have saved a few North Koreans last weekend, but the 11th Army Corps’ overall casualties were still startling high.
Last weekend, the 11th Army Corps of North Korea launched a series of attacks against Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, western Russia, killing and wounding about 200 troops, according to the most recent official estimate from Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation in Kyiv.
Some of those deaths were caused by explosive first-person-view drones decked out in Christmas decorations. A reindeer. . A Santa. A elf. A bird.
Videos of the joyous drone attacks, carried out by the Ukrainian 8th Special Purpose Regiment stationed at the southwest corner of the 250-square-mile salient that the Ukrainians had carved out of Kursk in August, surfaced online on Tuesday.
The deadly gravity of their mission is concealed by the dark humor of the Ukrainian drone operators. After three expensive infantry assaults last weekend, the combined Russian-North Korean force was able to retake the village of Plekhove, which is located on the eastern edge of the salient, thanks to North Korean manpower that considerably stiffened Russian assaults in Kursk.
The combined number of North Korean and Russian troops in and around Kursk is approximately 60,000. There are only 20,000 for the Ukrainians. However, the Russians and North Koreans only gain a minor advantage due to the manpower imbalance because attacking across open ground is always riskier than defending from dug-in positions.
Additionally, if North Korean and Russian leaders do not adopt Ukrainian tactics, that advantage may be rapidly lost. Without much apparent assistance from artillery or aircraft, the first assaults over the weekend involved dismounted infantry moving across snowy fields in neat lines. Ukraine’s FPV drones and cluster shells found the darkly camouflaged North Koreans to be easy targets because they stood out against the white snow.
The North Korean survivors find it reassuring that they at least did not charge into combat with the misconception that remaining motionless can conceal oneself from the unwavering attention of a nearby drone operator—much like savannah prey hiding in the grass to elude a lion. The North Koreans have been seen dodging drone attacks, though they haven’t always been successful.
Some Russian trainees have obviously been told to freeze in place when they see or hear an approaching drone, while others practice dodging incoming FPVs, occasionally with the aid of an odd “drone on a rope” training aid.
There is a lot of evidence that Russian soldiers have tried this strategy, but there is also a lot of evidence that it fails. That’s how good drone cameras are. Additionally, their operators possess that level of expertise.
The 11th Army Corps suffered shockingly high overall casualties last weekend, even though dodging may have saved a few North Koreans.
