Syria’s rebel leader Abu Mohammed al

The transformation of Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani from Syrian jihadist leader to rebel politician.

Six hours ago.

Alma Al-Lami.

Media Specialist on Jihadism, BBC Monitoring.

Before President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown on Thursday, Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani abandoned the alias linked to his jihadist past and began using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official statements.

As his Islamist militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which leads other rebel factions, announces the capture of the Syrian capital, Damascus, solidifying its control over much of the country, Jawlani is making this move as part of his attempt to strengthen his legitimacy in a new setting.

Jawlani’s change is not new; rather, it has been carefully fostered over time, as seen by his changing appearance as well as his public remarks and interviews with foreign media.

Previously dressed in traditional jihadist militant garb, he has recently embraced a more Western-inspired wardrobe. He has now put on military fatigues to represent his position as the operations room commander while spearheading the offensive.

Why and how has Jawlani, also known as Ahmed al-Sharaa, changed?

The link between Iraq and IS.

Jawlani was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his father was employed as an oil engineer until 1989, according to a 2021 PBS interview.

That year, the Jawlani family moved back to Syria, where he was raised in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus.

Jawlani’s jihadist career started in Iraq, where he was connected to al-Qaeda via the progenitor organization of the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda in Iraq, and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

He joined other foreign fighters in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. He was imprisoned at Camp Bucca in 2005, where he strengthened his jihadist ties and eventually met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the quiet scholar who would later become the leader of IS.

Jawlani was sent to Syria by Baghdadi in 2011 with financial support to create the ISI-affiliated covert group known as al-Nusra Front. While concealing its connections to IS and al-Qaeda, Nusra had emerged as a significant Syrian combatant group by 2012.

In 2013, tensions increased when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unilaterally announced the merger of ISI and Nusra, proclaimed the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and made public the connections between the two groups for the first time.

Jawlani objected, wanting to disassociate his group from ISI’s brutal methods, which caused a rift.

In order to escape that predicament, Jawlani swore loyalty to al-Qaeda, establishing Nusra Front as its Syrian affiliate.

Gaining Syrian support was his top priority right away, as he distanced himself from IS’s violence and emphasized a more practical approach to jihad.

Joining al-Qaeda.

Al-Nusra Front joined IS as an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria in April 2013.

Jawlani’s decision was made in part to keep local support and keep Syrians and rebel groups from becoming hostile, but in the end, the al-Qaeda connection did little to help this cause.

When Nusra and other groups took control of Idlib province in 2015 and were compelled to cooperate in its governance, it became an urgent issue.

After breaking off relations with al-Qaeda in 2016, Jawlani renamed the organization Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, which was subsequently renamed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.

Although it looked superficial at first, the split exposed more profound divisions. Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, was founded after Jawlani was accused of betraying al-Qaeda, which resulted in defections and its eventual destruction by HTS in 2020. Nonetheless, Hurras al-Din members have continued to be present in the area with caution.

HTS also dismantled IS networks and forced some foreign fighters and IS operatives in Idlib to participate in “deradicalization” programs.

Jawlani’s plan to establish HTS as a powerful and politically viable force in Syria was indicated by these actions, which were rationalized as attempts to bring militant forces together and lessen infighting.

The United States, United Kingdom, and other nations continued to designate HTS as a terrorist organization, and the United States maintained a $10 million reward for information regarding Jawlani’s whereabouts, despite the group’s public separation from al-Qaeda and name changes. Western nations believed that the split was a front.

establishing an Idlib “government.”.

Under Jawlani, HTS took control of Idlib, the largest rebel stronghold in northwest Syria, which is home to roughly four million people, many of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces.

In 2017, HTS formed a civilian front, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG), as its political and administrative arm in response to worries about a militant group controlling the region.

A prime minister, ministries, and local departments oversaw areas like education, health, and reconstruction, and the SG operated like a state with a religious council that was governed by Sharia, or Islamic law.

Jawlani visited camps for displaced people, went to events, and managed relief efforts in order to change his reputation, especially during emergencies like the 2023 earthquakes.

In order to justify its rule and show that it can deliver stability and services, HTS emphasized its accomplishments in infrastructure and governance.

The Taliban were hailed as an inspiration and a model for successfully striking a balance between jihadist endeavors and political ambitions, including making tactical concessions to accomplish their objectives, when they were first brought back to power in 2021.

Jawlani’s actions in Idlib were part of a larger plan to show that HTS could successfully govern in addition to waging jihad.

He sought to establish Idlib as a success story under HTS control by emphasizing stability, public services, and reconstruction. This would increase the legitimacy of his group and further his own political goals.

However, in its attempt to establish dominance and strengthen its position, HTS has suppressed and disenfranchised other militant groups, including both jihadist and rebel groups, under his direction.

anti-HTS demonstrations.

Before the HTS-led rebel offensive on November 27, Jawlani had to deal with protests in Idlib from Syrian activists and hardline Islamists for more than a year.

Accusing HTS of authoritarianism, repressing dissent, and silencing critics, critics likened his rule to that of Assad. The term “Shabbiha,” which is used to refer to Assad’s loyalist goons, was used by protesters to refer to HTS’s security forces.

They also claimed that in order to please foreign actors, HTS purposefully avoided engaging in significant combat with government forces and isolated jihadists and foreign fighters in Idlib to stop them from doing so.

Activists have repeatedly called on HTS to free those detained in Idlib for allegedly voicing dissent, even during the most recent offensive.

HTS has implemented a number of reforms in the last year in response to these criticisms. A contentious security force that was accused of violating human rights was dissolved or renamed, and a “Department of Grievances” was established to enable the public to file complaints against the organization. These actions, according to its detractors, were merely a show to quell dissent.

HTS claimed that unity under a single leadership was essential to progress and the eventual overthrow of the Syrian government, which served as justification for its consolidation of power in Idlib and the repression of plurality among militant groups.

HTS and its civilian branch, the SG, navigated a fine line between preserving their Islamist identity to appease hardliners in rebel-held areas and among HTS members, and trying to present a contemporary, moderate image to appeal to the local populace and the broader world.

For example, in December 2023, HTS and the SG became the target of criticism after a “festival” at a brand-new, gleaming mall was deemed “immoral” by hardliners.

Additionally, a ceremony inspired by the Paralympic Games in August drew harsh criticism from hardliners, which led the SG to examine how such events are organized.

These incidents highlight the difficulties HTS has in balancing the wants of its Islamist base with the more general aspirations of the Syrian people, who are longing for freedom and harmony following years of Assad’s cruel rule.

Setting a new course?

Both domestic and foreign audiences have since been reassured by Jawlani and the SG.

They pledged safety to Syrians, including minorities, and peace to neighbors and nations like Russia. Even if attacks stopped, Jawlani promised Russia that its Syrian bases would be safe.

Since 2017, HTS has prioritized pragmatism over dogmatic ideology in its “moderate jihad” strategy, which is reflected in this change.

Jawlani’s strategy may be a sign of the demise of international jihadist groups like IS and al-Qaeda, whose rigidity is becoming more and more viewed as unworkable and unsustainable.

His path could serve as a model for other groups to follow, either signaling a new era of politically flexible, localized “jihadism” or merely a brief departure from the accepted course in pursuit of territorial and political gains.