Bashar al-Assad, infamous for his chemical attacks, war crimes, and alliances with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah in his violent crackdown, fled to Russia as his regime crumbled.
But despite its promises of unwavering support, Russia ultimately failed to prevent Assad’s collapse — a stark reflection of its very limited resources.
There is also the question of how Russia’s military and intelligence missed signs that rebel forces were preparing an offensive.
This failure allowed opposition fighters to overrun key territories, catching Assad’s regime and Moscow off guard.
The loss of Assad, Russia’s significant ally in the Middle East, has dealt a severe blow to Moscow.
Previously, it seemed impossible, but the Syrian people succeeded. They overthrew the cruel tyrant who slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people in one of the most oppressive regimes. As his regime collapsed, Bashar al-Assad, who was notorious for his chemical attacks, war crimes, and collaborations with Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah in his brutal crackdown, fled to Russia.
For the Syrian people, whose tenacity matched their unrelenting resistance to a ruthless government supported by foreign powers for more than ten years, this was a huge victory. Russia is the most important of these.
After a 13-year war and 60 years of his family’s autocratic rule, Syrian rebels stormed through the country and took Damascus without resistance, forcing Assad to flee to Russia for asylum. Assad now stands alongside another pro-Kremlin leader who fled to Russia, Yanukovych, the treasonous former president of Ukraine.
Assad’s downfall is a humiliating blow to Russia’s reputation around the world, as Moscow has been supporting him for more than ten years. However, in the end, Russia was unable to stop Assad’s downfall despite its assurances of unwavering support, which is a clear indication of its extremely limited resources.
Another question is how Russia’s intelligence and military failed to recognize indications that rebel forces were getting ready to launch an offensive. This setback gave opposition fighters the opportunity to seize strategic areas, surprising both Moscow and Assad’s government. The firing of Lieutenant General Sergey Kisel, who oversaw Moscow’s operations in Syria, is rumored to have demonstrated the growing dissatisfaction within Russia’s leadership, casting doubt on its ability to lead and portending possible instability in the wake of its strategic setbacks in Syria.
In 2015, Russia formally entered the Syrian conflict by launching airstrikes against civilian housing, schools, hospitals, and humanitarian corridors in addition to opposition groups. For more than ten years, Russia’s ruthless methods—such as carpet bombing cities—mirrored the approach it took in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, even though Moscow displayed “strength,” it was powerless to prevent Assad’s regime from falling.
In the meantime, in an effort to maintain its reputation as a staunch supporter of authoritarian governments despite their downfall, Russia gave Assad and his family asylum. Moscow sought to convey that it is still a trustworthy ally while handling the fallout from Assad’s overthrow by making the asylum public. “Assad and his family are in Moscow,” the Russian ambassador to Vienna wrote on X. When things get tough, Russia doesn’t turn on its friends. This is how Russia and the US differ from one another. Russian military bloggers, who denounced the Syrian army’s collapse as a result of the regime’s corruption and lack of leadership, expressed their disapproval and outright rage at this decision.
Russia’s engagement went well beyond providing military support and working with Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah. The Kremlin’s willingness to collaborate with these organizations, frequently through terrorist means, became a defining feature of its foreign policy. Russia further ingrained itself in the nation by establishing shared intelligence and joint control centers. Russia backed Assad’s government not only militarily but also after it was accused of committing war crimes, using chemical and poison gas weapons, systematically attacking civilians, and leaving mass graves all over Syria. The notorious Wagner Group was one of the mercenaries sent by Russia that committed horrifying crimes against civilians.
In an effort to hide Assad’s crimes, Russia launched a vigorous disinformation campaign, portraying the conflict as an internal struggle led by the opposition rather than the violence of the regime. To make it more difficult to secure foreign support for the opposition, this attempt sought to perplex the international community and hide the actual nature of the violence. Russia falsely placed the blame for the violence, mass murders, and chemical attacks on the opposition by calling them “terrorists,” which served as justification for Assad’s war crimes. In addition to defending the regime, this campaign put opposition and humanitarian organizations in jeopardy by attempting to damage their reputations as millions of Syrians suffered.
Similar to the misinformation Russia disseminated in Ukraine following its illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, its mass propaganda was especially successful in depicting the civil war as a convoluted internal conflict. Russian disinformation perplexed the international community and hindered a suitable response by portraying the conflict as a rebellion. The situation’s reality was further distorted by media outlets, who frequently repeated these false narratives without realizing it.
Moscow reportedly rushed to remove its military assets from Syria, including relocating naval ships out of Tartus, following the abrupt overthrow of Assad’s government. If accurate, reports that Russia asked Turkey for help in order to guarantee the safe departure of its troops further embarrassment for the Kremlin. Once a vital location for demonstrating Russian dominance in the area, Tartus now represents Moscow’s inability to maintain its position and raises questions about its ability to continue to have an impact in the Middle East.
Russia reportedly negotiated frantically with Syria’s new government to keep access to its remaining bases in an attempt to save some of its investments. However, any agreements reached were, at best, tenuous due to Damascus’s changing political climate. Russia, a purported superpower, was further humiliated on the international scene by the very idea that it needed a NATO member like Turkey to extract its military.
The fall of Assad’s government and the possible loss of Russian military installations in Syria pose serious obstacles to Moscow’s capacity to conduct operations and sustain its power in the Middle East and Africa. Khmeimim Airbase has been a vital location for Russia, allowing it to send supplies, equipment, and mercenaries to African nations like Mali and the Central African Republic. Russia’s mercenary rotations, resupply operations, and overall influence throughout sub-Saharan Africa would all be significantly disrupted if its bases were lost.
Furthermore, Russia’s role in Middle Eastern power dynamics is weakened, its overstretched global ambitions are exposed, and its regional authority is undermined as its military presence in Syria declines.
Moscow has suffered a serious setback with the death of Assad, Russia’s key Middle Eastern ally. Along with shattering Russia’s aspirations for regional supremacy, it also dealt Putin a psychological blow, casting doubt on his reputation for steadfast allegiance to authoritarian allies. Given that Russia’s resources are being depleted by its ongoing full-scale war in Ukraine, the breakdown of its strategy in Syria raises more general concerns about its capacity to retain influence in other areas.
Although Russia has a history of supporting authoritarian regimes, this approach is not without its risks. This is an essentially faulty long-term geopolitical strategy because authoritarian regimes can fall apart quickly and without much notice, as Assad’s sudden overthrow this past weekend showed.
