This week, the New York Times reported that President Trump has authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela.
How we got here It’s not exactly news that the US would rather have a different government in Venezuela.
(Since it took power, the Trump administration has lifted legal protections for Venezuelans in America, putting hundreds of thousands at risk of deportation.)
Opponents of the Venezuelan regime are optimistic that targeting the government’s criminal enterprises is key to finally bringing it down.
Whether he escalates in Venezuela may depend on whether he can be convinced that achieving one there is on the table.
There’s something the US is doing in Venezuela. But what precisely?
Since early September, the Trump administration has claimed that members of Venezuelan drug cartels that the US government has classified as terrorist groups are operating at least five deadly strikes on civilian boats in the Caribbean that the US military has carried out. According to reports, these strikes have killed 27 people. The US is currently engaged in armed conflict with these cartels, according to President Donald Trump, who has told Congress as much.
The attacks take place as part of a massive US military buildup in the Caribbean that includes about 10,000 soldiers, F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 reaper drones, guided-missile destroyers, and a covert ship that is intended to transport special operations forces. During World War II, the US committed less firepower to the Battle of Midway than this. Special operations helicopters have recently flown less than 90 miles from the Venezuelan coast, according to the Washington Post.
The New York Times revealed this week that President Trump has given the go-ahead for secret CIA operations within Venezuela. Trump confirmed on Wednesday that he is thinking about hitting targets on American soil after acknowledging the report, which means these operations are no longer exactly “covert.”. For the first time, survivors of the most recent boat strike were reported on Friday. As the first prisoners of war in this most recent conflict, they were arrested. This week as well, Adm. Less than a year into his term, US Southern Command chief Alvin Holsey, who was in charge of the buildup, resigned. Although it’s unclear why, the timing has drawn criticism.
All of this has stoked rumors that the administration is preparing a military takeover to overthrow longtime US adversary President Nicolas Maduro. “No to regime change, which reminds us so much of the endless, failed wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and so on,” Maduro said Thursday night in a televised speech. Don’t support coups d’etat that are CIA-sponsored. In response to the escalating threat, Maduro’s administration has been enlisting militias and troops and intensifying its domestic propaganda.
While addressing reporters on Wednesday, Trump said it was “a ridiculous question for me to answer” and did not confirm or deny that he was thinking about trying to topple Maduro. Maduro had offered to resign in three years and hand over power to his vice president, but the White House reportedly rejected the plan.
In the Venezuelan opposition, Trump’s focus on the nation has also sparked optimism. In the past, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has stated that Maduro would probably only step down “in the face of a credible, imminent, and severe threat of the use of force.” Machado dedicated her Nobel Peace Prize last week to President Trump for his decisive support of our cause. “”.
On Friday, it seemed highly likely that the United States military might use force against suspected cartel targets in Venezuela in the days ahead. These could include airstrips used for the shipment of cocaine, drug labs, or the camps of armed groups supported by the regime.
Furthermore, it is at least conceivable—and obviously the White House wants Maduro to believe it is conceivable—that the United States could directly target Maduro or other top Venezuelan officials.
On the other hand, it seems just as likely that the administration could continue its current path of blowing up boats in the Caribbean without escalating its conflict to attacks on land.
What will determine the outcome of this campaign, what will tip the scales, and what path will Trump choose?
Our journey to this point.
The United States’ preference for a different government in Venezuela is not particularly new. Since Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chavez, came to power in 2000 and remained in office until his death in 2013, relations between Washington and Caracas have been bleak. Under Chavez and Maduro, the left-wing Bolivarian socialist government vehemently opposed US influence in Latin America, backed militant organizations overseas like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and kept tight ties with US enemies like Russia, Iran, and Cuba.
Venezuela’s badly run oil-dependent economy has been in a tailspin for the past ten years, with hyperinflation and high unemployment. There has been a surge in violent crime, pervasive corruption, and the regime’s full-scale attack on opposition parties and civil liberties at the same time. More than 6 million Venezuelans have fled their country as a result of all these reasons, making them the largest group of refugees in the world.
Since its first term in office, the Trump administration has prioritized overthrowing Maduro. The United States officially acknowledged opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president following the highly contentious 2018 presidential elections, despite Guaido’s exile. In 2019, Guaido attended Trump’s State of the Union speech as a guest. At the time, the administration used both overt (sanctions and diplomatic pressure) and covert (espionage and cyberattacks) tactics to try to remove Maduro from office. Maduro was charged with narcoterrorism and cocaine smuggling in a New York court in 2020. Recently, $50 million was added to the award for his arrest.
After Venezuela’s similarly dubious 2024 election, the Biden administration again recognized Maduro’s opponent as the legitimate winner.
In spite of all of this, there were some initial indications of a thaw in the relationship when Trump took office. Negotiations between Maduro’s government and Trump’s special missions envoy Ric Grenell produced some noteworthy cooperation. Venezuela agreed to accept flights that would return its deported citizens from the United States, and it also freed a number of Americans who had been held in the country. The Trump administration has removed legal protections for Venezuelans in the United States since taking office, putting hundreds of thousands at risk of deportation. ).
By April or so, however, détente was in ruins, and proponents of “maximum pressure” had taken over the US administration’s Venezuela file. Most notably, since his time as a senator, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has pushed for more forceful actions against Maduro, including the possibility of using military force.
MAGA meets the Monroe Doctrine.
By frequently citing the Monroe Doctrine, a 19th-century foreign policy strategy designed to guarantee US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, the Trump administration has pushed for a shift in US defense and diplomatic priorities toward Latin America.
The removal of Maduro was described as “unfinished business” from Trump’s first term by Chris Sabatini, senior fellow for Latin America at Chatham House, and the most recent escalation was a continuation of its long-standing policies. The focus on military force is not the only thing that differs this time, he claimed; the White House’s approach is “calibrated to appeal to the MAGA base.”. “.”.
This entails highlighting Venezuela’s relationship to migration and drugs, two of the president’s top concerns. Trump has specifically targeted the criminal gang Tren de Aragua in Venezuela, which his administration recently declared to be a terrorist organization. He has also accused Maduro of successfully using drugs, gangs, and mass migration as weapons against the United States. Because Venezuela had “emptied their prisons into the United States of America,” Trump claimed this week that he had approved the CIA’s clandestine operations. “.”.
There is no proof that the Maduro government controls Tren de Aragua or is using migration as a weapon. The regime and the chaos it has caused have forced the majority of Venezuelans living in the US to flee.
Regarding drugs, Venezuela is not a major producer, but under Maduro, it has developed into a major transshipment hub for South American cocaine headed for the US, Central America, West Africa, and Europe.
Another group, the Cartel de los Soles, was designated a terrorist organization by the administration over the summer. The Treasury Department characterized the group as a “criminal organization based in Venezuela and led by Nicolas Maduro.”. This makes Maduro the head of a terrorist group at war with the United States and, presumably, a legitimate target under the legal reasoning of the Trump administration.
Unquestionably, Maduro and his top leaders are connected to drug trafficking and other illegal activities. The president of Venezuela, however, is also not Pablo Escobar.
Known as the “Cartel of the Suns,” after the stars on generals’ uniforms, it refers to a loose network of high-ranking Venezuelan military officials who control a variety of illegal businesses, from illegal gold mining to drug smuggling.
Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, a group that monitors Latin American organized crime, called it a “feudal system,” where Maduro gives subordinates authority over regions and the criminal activities that take place there in order to maintain allegiance.
“Maduro is not going to turn around and say, ‘Hey, listen, we’re going to ship this shipment to the Dominican Republic right now,'” McDermott informed Vox.
Beyond the specifics of the “cartel,” the Trump administration’s approach—attacks on the boats thus far, and even more so if those turn into land-based strikes—raises significant legal questions. The administration contends that the harm caused by drugs entering the US makes its actions—which Congress has not approved—legally justified as an act of self-defense.
The approach calls into question whether “we see trafficking and illicit drugs as a crime or as a physical threat to the safety and security of our nation that would require the use of the military,” James Saenze, who served as the Biden administration’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics, tells Vox.
Although drugs certainly harm American society, Saenz contends that interpreting them as a kind of terrorism-like aggression ignores the fact that the drugs are being purchased by American citizens. According to the US military, “if you don’t get rid of the demand, there’s always going to be someone who’s going to meet the demand,” regardless of the measures taken against the producers and suppliers of cocaine or other drugs. “”.
Is a regime change imminent?
Opponents of the Venezuelan regime are optimistic that targeting the government’s criminal enterprises is key to finally bringing it down.
“The glue that is keeping the high ranks within the Army loyal is narcotrafficking and illicit economies,” stated Miguel Pizarro, a politician from the Venezuelan opposition who is currently a senior aide in the opposition’s office in Washington, DC. The structure of this regime is far more influenced by corruption, wealth, and privilege than by ideology. Pizarro continued by saying that in addition to applying pressure on the regime, assurances regarding the safety of its officials who have not participated in its most heinous crimes must be provided, as well as a “life after power” guarantee. “.”.
Could the US take more aggressive action if economic and military pressure fail to overthrow Maduro from within? The closest example would be the US invasion of Panama in 1989, which overthrew and detained dictator Manuel Noriega, who, like Maduro, had been charged with drug offenses in the US. Nonetheless, Venezuela is a far bigger nation in a far more precarious political stand.
The forces currently gathered in the Caribbean are likely insufficient for a full-scale invasion, despite Trump’s significant escalation. However, this does not preclude the deployment of special operations forces or targeted drone strikes against Maduro or other top regime officials. Representative. Leading congressional critic of the Maduro regime Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) recently proposed that Venezuelan officials take into account what happened to Qasem Soleimani, the senior Iranian general who was killed in a US drone strike during the first Trump administration.
But by bringing up previous US intervention failures, Maduro was obviously trying to remind the American people that regime change, no matter how it is implemented, is a dangerous tactic.
“Just removing the top leadership won’t change the regime, and it’s not likely to lead to a democratic transition either,” Sabatini of Chatham House stated.
Despite the chaos and complexity of Venezuela following years of Maduro’s rule, Pizarro, the opposition representative for Venezuela, rejected comparisons to Iraq or Libya, stating that the populace is largely united in their hope for an alternative and is unlikely to devolve into civil war if the US overthrows him.
“The current state of chaos, disorder, and territorial disintegration is the worst scenario for us,” he stated. Moving out of that situation is, in our opinion, completely possible. “.”.
Trump’s actions in Syria, Yemen, Iran, and other places have demonstrated that while he is not opposed to using military force, the prospective Nobel laureate is cautious about becoming mired in protracted ground campaigns. In this instance, he might be especially worried about the potential for a power vacuum to lead to more Venezuelans emigrating to the US.
The president likes to use the military to achieve swift, clear victories. Depending on whether he can be persuaded that reaching one there is possible, he might escalate in Venezuela.






