How to Put an End to the War in Gaza Permanently

By early Saturday, if everything goes according to plan, Israel and Hamas will begin to observe a cease-fire. Israeli troops will move from their current positions to a predetermined line farther back in Gaza, and their weapons will cease to fire. Meanwhile, in exchange for 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences and an additional 1,750 Gazans that Israel has captured over the past two years, Hamas will free all of the hostages who are still alive. There will be an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, and Palestinians will start working to rebuild the enclave, clear the debris, and start a small business again.

However, U…. A. These actions are merely the first of two phases that make up President Donald Trump’s peace plan. Furthermore, compared to the suggested components of phase two, these measures are much simpler to execute, despite the fact that they are clearly challenging (considering how long it has taken for Israel and Hamas to agree to them). This phase entails disarming Hamas, Israel’s further withdrawal to a buffer zone just inside Gazan territory, followed by a full withdrawal once Gaza no longer poses a threat to the nation, the establishment of an international stabilization force, a board of peace to supervise the enclave’s governance and a technocratic group of Palestinians to run it, and the actual reconstruction and investment in the strip. In order to pave the way for Gaza and the West Bank’s political reunification as well as the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and statehood, it also entails a genuine reform of the Palestinian Authority, which oversees the West Bank.

Achieving these objectives will require negotiating a number of politically and technically sensitive issues. For instance, negotiators will need to decide how and when the IDF will leave, who will be part of the international stabilization force that takes its place, where that force will deploy, and what its responsibilities are. Egypt and Jordan-trained Palestinian security forces will maintain law and order in the interior of the enclave, according to the Egyptian and Emirati governments, while the stabilization force will deploy to the crossing points. This force and the Israelis are likely to encounter significant challenges, including the genuine potential for Hamas to attempt to enslave the Gazan clans that have been collaborating with Israel, such as the al-Shabab, al-Astal, al-Manasi, and al-Da’mush. The group’s sole motivation would be to keep control of the strip. And in the event that Hamas tries to reassert itself, it is completely unclear what anyone will or ought to do. The expectations of Hamas and Israel regarding the future of Gaza are significantly different.

There are real issues and uncertainties. Even though the path ahead is challenging, there is cause for optimism. This agreement’s second phase can be accomplished using the same forces that created its first. Both the Arab states and the United States can continue to put pressure on Hamas and Israel, respectively. In order to determine the parameters and makeup of the stabilization force, Washington and its partners can utilize the channels they established to get to phase one. Additionally, Israel can continue to collaborate with Arab nations to establish a better, peaceful government in Gaza.

PRESSED.

In large part, this cease-fire was made possible by U. S. All parties concerned received a clear message from President Donald Trump that the time had come to end the war and free the hostages. It was the most recent example of a well-known fact: the US has significant influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Washington has “99 percent of the cards,” as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stated in 1977 when he announced his decision to make peace with Israel. He realized that no one else was able to relocate the nation.

Think back to the previous few weeks, when Trump influenced Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept this agreement. Netanyahu might have been capable of fending off U. A. President Joe Biden’s efforts to promote peace by enlisting Republican support caused division in Washington. He didn’t have that choice with Trump, though. The Israeli prime minister is all too aware that there is no significant political support for Netanyahu’s continued battle over Trump’s objections. He was not interested in seeing what Trump would do if he turned down his suggestions.

Trump’s efforts to put an end to this war also required him to play a crucial role. Hamas is susceptible to pressure from Turkey and the major Arab nations. Also, these states want to have a positive relationship with Trump and for him to care about their own prosperity, which implies that the US president also indirectly influences Hamas. For instance, it appears that the Arab nations and Turkey thought it was time to end the war, so they put significant pressure on Hamas to agree to Trump’s proposal.

The Arab states and Turkey have a lot of reasons to want to get along with Trump. Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, desires American F-35s. Mohamed bin Zayid, the leader of the United Arab Emirates, and Mohammed bin Salman, the leader of Saudi Arabia, both desire greater U.S. cooperation in artificial intelligence. S. army assistance. When Trump gave Qatar a security pledge that, at least in theory, is nearly equal to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause, they took notice. They understood that Trump could further their objectives.

All of the major Arab nations, particularly the so-called Arab Quint (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), are desperate to put an end to a conflict that, at best, would make it more difficult for them to expand their economies and, at worst, endanger their governments. Anger among their populations is being stoked by the fighting, and this rage can be channeled in unpredictable and potentially harmful ways. That meant they were eager to put pressure on and isolate Hamas in exchange for a solution that only Trump could persuade Israel to offer.

Nobody is going to want to be held accountable for starting the war.

A final factor contributed to the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas: Israelis are beginning to realize that, despite their remarkable military successes shifting the regional power balance and undermining Iran and its proxy network, they have lost the political war. Their nation has never been so isolated on a global scale. Leading the push to recognize a Palestinian state are many of Israel’s longstanding European allies, some of whom are denouncing what they claim are Israeli war crimes in Gaza. The actions of Israel have been met with massive protests from the European public. Although polls indicate that Trump has seen a sharp decline in support even within his own nation, with American Democrats, independents, and younger Republicans now showing significantly less sympathy for Israel, he has largely protected Israel from this international pressure. Many Israelis instinctively believe that they cannot meet their own needs and ensure their security while simultaneously appeasing the outside world. But the harsh truth is that Israel’s security will be worse off if it stays this isolated than if it gives up on Netanyahu’s objective, which was to completely subjugate Hamas in Gaza (which seemed to take an interminable campaign). The prime minister eventually appeared to concur that it was time to figure out how to put an end to the conflict.

Incentives that align.

Hamas may attempt to break the terms of the cease-fire because it is enraged about losing power and determined to undermine Israel. If so, it could lead to a new conflict. Israel will take action if the group attempts a swift recovery and the stabilization force and interim government do nothing to stop it.

Nevertheless, it is hoped that this administration and the force will oppose any such attempt by Hamas. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two nations most likely to contribute to reconstruction, share Israel’s objective of disarming Hamas and ensuring that it loses control of Gaza. Additionally, there is reason for hope given the larger constellation of forces, which includes a strong US, a larger Arab world dedicated to assisting in the conflict’s resolution, and Israel, which wants the fighting to end. They indicate that the last challenges can be solved.

By itself, phase one implementation will generate some momentum for phase two, including by decreasing the incentives to fight again. Nobody will want to be held accountable for starting the conflict again. However, this momentum won’t last forever. The Trump administration must, at the very least, move swiftly to collaborate with its allies in order to clearly explain the meaning of each of the remaining 20 points in the president’s plan, as well as who will be responsible for what actions to carry them out. The government must therefore specify the proper method for disarmament. It ought to clarify the amount of disarmament needed before Israel can proceed to the following stage of its withdrawal. Washington and its allies must decide which forces will enter Gaza and ensure that they are present at more than just the crossing points. One cannot expect Palestinian security forces to take on the duty of defending the Gazan populace right away. In addition to determining whether or not foreign forces will be included in the stabilization force, the United States and its allies must also clarify what Washington is willing to do to support this force logistically, including supplying intelligence and liaising with Israel. The United States, the Arab nations, and other stakeholders must also determine what and who will increase humanitarian aid. In Gaza, they must figure out how to make sure that aid reaches the people who need it the most and isn’t taken by Hamas or other armed militants.

The Gaza population is Palestinian and longs for normalcy, so it is likely to support the forces providing aid and protecting the populace. The development of a practical security system that can handle all of these issues, however, will take perseverance and diligence. To keep everyone accountable, Trump and his foreign policy team—which probably needs to be enlarged to handle all the various issues—must stay engaged and focused.

Their nation has never been so isolated on a global scale.

Meanwhile, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority must continue to be under pressure from the Arab states. These nations—or at least Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—appear to be at last prepared to take on a far higher level of responsibility for the Palestinian people. There has been a radical shift. Arab nations have historically used the Palestinian problem as a political catchphrase without showing much interest in finding a solution. They have believed that Israel and the United States are to blame for the conflict. Yasir Arafat, the leader of Palestine, was under pressure from the Arab states to accept the U.S. S. None of them accepted President Bill Clinton’s terms for ending the war in December 2000. This was due in large part to the Arab states’ fear that Arafat would accuse them of attempting to pressure him into abandoning the Palestinian cause. Today’s Palestinian leaders, however, lack Arafat’s stature, and major Arab nations are aware that neglecting the Palestinian issue could jeopardize their own goals and intentions. They are therefore more inclined to support actions on the ground to guarantee that Hamas cannot directly or indirectly control Gaza. The Arab states must also demand that the Palestinian Authority implement significant reforms in order to bring about a sustainable peace, including the removal of Mahmoud Abbas, the organization’s discredited leader, and the appointment of a new, globally regarded leader in his place. If Gaza and the West Bank are to be politically united, such actions are required. Trump is more likely to pressure Israel to halt the war in Gaza and its encroaching annexation of the West Bank if Arab nations take steps to establish a viable Palestinian government.

As for Israel, it needs to cooperate with the Arab nations to change Gaza. The administration must back a reform of the enclave’s educational system and, more importantly, support the eventual takeover of Gaza by a reformed Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu currently opposes such measures, but he needs to understand that Israel will benefit from the Arab commitment to redevelop Gaza. In turn, Arab nations need to continue to be open to cooperating with the Israeli government. That in turn necessitates mending the strained ties that exist between Israel and numerous of these states.

This will not be simple. However, the alternative—a return to combat—would be more detrimental. Thus, a dedicated Washington, working with Arab nations, can ensure that negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue on their current course and effectively end this horrific conflict.